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Abstract  
This paper challenges widely held claims that international bureaucracies lack the potential 
to profoundly shape the behaviour, roles and identities of its personnel, and that the role of 
international civil servants are primarily shaped by where the officials come from. It is 
argued and empirically suggested that international bureaucracies may possess considerable 
clout to shape some basic behavioural perceptions among its personnel. The rise of what is 
phrased as ‘actor-level supranationalism’ among international civil servants suggests that 
international bureaucracies ‘matter’ and adds value beyond being mere secretariats of 
member-state governments – thus serving a ‘common good’. Benefiting from a large and 
novel set of interviews with civil servants from the European Commission, the OECD 
Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat, ‘actor-level supranationalism’ is shown to rise through 
internal and external processes of socialisation and adaptation. Actor-level supranationalism 
is associated with four factors: (i) the length of tenure among international civil servants, (ii) 
types of prior institutional affiliations of these officials, (iii) size and scope of administrative 
capacities of international bureaucracies, and (iv) the power and autonomy of international 
bureaucracies.  
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Introduction: Actor-level supranationalism and the common good1 
Modern governments daily formulate and execute policies with consequences for the 
common good (Hupe and Edwards 2012). With the gradual increased role of international 
bureaucracies in this regard – notably the European Commission (Commission) - one 
unresolved question is to what extent and under what conditions international 
bureaucracies are vehicles for the ‘common good’. This is a sometimes favoured and 
sometimes detested role of international bureaucracies. Times of austerity and international 
crises tend to call upon international organisations to compensate for self-regarding 
governments. As an area of research, the extent to which and the conditions under which 
international bureaucracies serve a ‘common good’ has become increasingly vibrant, 
however, still offering inconclusive findings (e.g. Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Moravcsik 
1999). This paper challenges widely held claims that international bureaucracies lack the 
potential to profoundly shape the behaviour, roles and identities of its personnel, and that 
the role of international civil servants are primarily shaped by where the officials come from 
(cf. Hooghe 2007 and 2012). It is argued and empirically suggested that international 
bureaucracies – also beyond the Commission - may possess considerable clout to shape 
some basic behavioural perceptions among its personnel. The rise of what is phrased as 
‘actor-level supranationalism’ (see below) among international civil servants suggests that 
international bureaucracies ‘matter’ and adds value beyond being mere secretariats of 
member-state governments – thus serving a ‘common good’ (Moravcsik 1999; Radaelli and 
O’Connor 2009). The observations reported benefit from a large and novel set of 121 
interviews with civil servants working in three international bureaucracies: the secretariat of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the secretariat of the Organisation for Economic Co-
  
3 
operation and Development (OECD), and the Commission administration. An extensive use 
of quotes from the interviews is used to illustrate how and under what conditions 
international civil servants act as supranational actors. 
 
Supranationalism has been studied particularly in association with the EU (Checkel 2007; 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006; Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Nelsen and Stubb 2003; Rosamond 
2000; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Somek 2001; Trondal 2007). A stripped-down 
definition of supranationalism was presented by Rosamond (2000: 204) as ‘the development 
of authoritative institutions of governance and networks of policy-making activity above the 
nation-state’. An international organisation can thus be denoted ‘supranational’ when it 
constitutes an entity distinct from national governments and has a ‘separate identity and 
loyalty and exercises some measure of genuine autonomous power’ (Slaughter 2005: 22). A 
supranational mode of governance has furthermore been defined as a mode of governance 
in which international organisations possess jurisdiction over specific policy domains within 
the territory encompassed by member-states (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 8). These 
definitions of supranationalism relate mainly to the polity of international organisations, i.e. 
to institutions above the nation-state which possess authority and capacity to formulate and 
execute relatively independent public policy (e.g. Hooghe 2012: 91). 
 
One way of approaching if and under what conditions international bureaucracies are 
vehicles of the ‘common good’ is to examine how and when international civil servants 
evoke the role as ‘supranational actor’. Empirically this paper studies actor-level 
supranationalism in the three abovementioned international bureaucracies. Among these, 
the Commission has traditionally been conceived of as most supranational. This paper 
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considers the rise of common norms, values and goals inside international organisations 
(‘actor-level supranationalism’) to represent the ‘common good’. In classic theories of 
European integration – such as neo-functionalism – it is assumed that one of the key driving 
forces of integration is the shift of individual loyalties from the national to the international 
level (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006; Rosamond 2000). International institutions are assumed to 
have a capacity to create a sense of community and belonging beyond the nation-state, i.e. 
they socialise staff (Checkel 2007; Deutsch 1957; Haas 1958). The enactment of a 
supranational role may thus imply that individuals report loyalty to and a sense of belonging 
to an international organisation, and share, and act according to, some norms, ideas, beliefs 
and goals of the organisation. This paper shows that actor-level supranationalism is present 
among civil servants in all three international bureaucracies studied. International 
bureaucracies are thus important vehicles of the ‘common good’. Moreover, the 
Commission is not any different from the two other international bureaucracies in this 
regard. Yet, actor-level supranationalism takes several forms and can be explained by a 
variety of factors. Essentially, this study suggests that international bureaucracies may 
possess considerable capacity to shape their employees – both through behavioural and role 
internalisation and adaptation (see Trondal and Veggeland 2003).  
 
Theoretically the paper departs from a classic neo-functionalist theory of European 
integration assuming that one key driving force of integration is the shift of individual 
loyalties from the national to the international level. International institutions are thought to 
have the capacity to create senses of community and belonging that are relatively 
independent of the constituent states. However, to theoretically ‘normalise’ international 
bureaucracies it may also be useful to apply classic models of bureaucracies in our 
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understanding of international bureaucracy. Two models are easy targets: the model of 
representative bureaucracy and that of Weberian bureaucracy. These models are based on a 
set of assumptions as to the mechanisms involved in shaping norms and behaviours of civil 
servants. This paper suggests that actor-level supranationalism emerge through internal and 
external internalisation and adaptation processes to international bureaucracies. Actor-level 
supranationalism is particularly associated with four factors:  
(i) the length of tenure among international civil servants,  
(ii) types of prior institutional affiliations of these officials, 
(iii) size and scope of administrative capacities of international bureaucracies, and  
(iv) the power and autonomy of international bureaucracies.  
 
The paper proceeds in the following steps: The next section clarifies conceptually how actor-
level supranationalism can be empirically recognised as well as mechanisms that may help 
explain variations in this behavioural logic among international civil servants. The 
subsequent sections outline the methodology and data used to illuminate actor-level 
supranationalism, followed by an empirical section reporting key findings from these data.   
 
Analytical components 
I Representative bureaucracy, Weberian bureaucracy and the supranational actor 
The model of the representative bureaucracy assumes that the ‘baggage’ that civil servants 
bring with them into a bureaucracy profoundly shapes their behaviour, and furthermore that 
organisations perform better if their staff reflect the characteristics of their constituent 
populations (Andrews et al. 2005; Selden 1998). Civil servants’ former institutional 
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affiliations, their educational backgrounds, their geographical origins etc. are assumed to 
affect the way they act at office. The bureaucracy will thus change its performance according 
to the composition of staff. This is the picture of the embedded bureaucracy that reflects 
society broadly speaking. As indicated by Hooghe in her study of the Commission (2007 and 
2012), civil servants may share the international norms of an international organisation 
because of mechanisms in operation prior to the civil servants entering the organisation. 
Hooghe (2007: 64) concludes that more important than socialisation to international norms 
within the Commission is socialisation outside, and she states that ‘…several roads lead to 
Commission norms, but few run through international socialization’. Thus, the claims of 
Hooghe are a good illustration of a view which corresponds with the model of the 
representative bureaucracy, i.e. that what the civil servants bring with them into the 
organisation is of significance to its conduct. 
 
By contrast, a Weberian bureaucracy model assumes that bureaucracies possess the capacity 
to shape staff through a set of mechanisms, e.g. socialisation (behavioural internalisation 
through established bureaucratic cultures), discipline (behavioural adaptation through 
incentive systems) and control (behavioural adaptation through hierarchical control and 
supervision) (Page 1992; Weber 1983; Yi-Chong and Weller 2004). These mechanisms ensure 
that bureaucracies perform their tasks relatively independently of the individuals who are 
employed. Causal emphasis is thus put on the internal organisational structures of the 
bureaucracies. The Weberian bureaucracy model provides a picture of formal organisation 
as creator of ‘organisational man’ (Simon 1965) and as a stabilising element in politics more 
broadly (Olsen 2010). According to this model, bureaucracies develop their own nuts and 
bolts quite independently of society. The model implies that civil servants may act upon 
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roles that are shaped by the bureaucracy in which they are embedded. An organisational 
perspective ascribes an autonomous role for pre-existing organisational structures to explain 
the emergence of new organisational arrangements, and their effects (Egeberg 2012). 
Organisational dynamics and decision-making behaviour is framed by the heritage of 
organisational structures (Radin 2012: 17). Organisations create elements of robustness, and 
concepts such as ‘historical inefficiency’ and ‘path dependence’ suggest that the match 
between environments, organisational structures, and decision-making behaviour is not 
automatic and precise (Olsen 2010). An organisational approach suggests that the supply of 
organisational capacities have certain implications for how organisations and humans act.  
This approach departs from the assumption that formal organisational structures mobilise 
biases in public policy because formal organisations supply cognitive and normative 
shortcuts and categories that simplify and guide decision-makers’ behaviour (Ellis 2011; 
Schattschneider 1975; Simon 1965).  
 
Hooghe (2007: 87) suggests that one weakness of international socialisation is that 
international organisations lack control over their members’ life chances. She partly bases 
this claim on the observation that international organisations are generally thought to be 
more prone to having employees working for a shorter time period, many on short-term 
contracts. If a lack of control over the member’s life chances is a salient characteristic of an 
international bureaucracy, it would undermine one of the key elements of the Weberian 
bureaucracy – namely the idea of stability through bureaucrats’ lifelong careers. Hooghe 
thus assumes that an international organisation has limited capacity for shaping the roles, 
norms and behaviour of its civil servants, precisely because of the weakness of the key 
elements suggested by the Weberian model. We challenge this as a general characteristic of 
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international bureaucracies. Even international bureaucracies may possess considerable 
institutional capacity to shape their staff, also when the personnel is on temporary 
contracts. 
 
Actor-level supranationalism is relevant for the Weberian bureaucracy model in several 
ways. Firstly, working in an international bureaucracy means that civil servants must ‘leave 
their passports at the door’, i.e. they are obliged to work for and represent the international 
organisation and not particular national interests. The WTO agreement refers to this as the 
‘international character of the responsibilities’.2 The WTO agreement even states that the 
responsibilities of the staff of the organisation should be ‘exclusively’ international in 
character (ibid.). This reference illustrates the supranational affiliation of international civil 
servants. It is assumed that officials are exclusively loyal to the international organisation in 
which they serve. According to the definition of actor-level supranationalism suggested 
below, civil servants are assumed to be dedicated to the overarching mission of an 
international organisation. Furthermore, the presence of this behavioural logic assumes 
some sort of autonomy for the international bureaucracy in question. The international 
bureaucracy is not merely a powerless tool in the hands of national governments, but 
assumed to have its own ‘organisational personality’ which is played out within the 
overarching framework and goals of the wider international organisation (Trondal 2007).  
 
II Actor-level supranationalism: an analytical framework 
This section presents an analytical framework for the study of how actor-level 
supranationalism is enacted in international bureaucracies: (i) under what conditions are 
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actor-level supranationalism likely to emerge among international civil servants, and (ii) how 
can we empirically recognise this behavioural logic when we see it? 
 
(i) There may be several reasons why international civil servants enact a 
supranational behavioural logic. This paper suggests a two-by-two analytical grid: 
This behavioural logic may be adopted and/or internalised; secondly, this 
behavioural logic may be caused by external and/or internal processes to the 
international bureaucracy. This paper thus makes an analytical distinction 
between actor-level supranationalism caused by the internalisation of roles and 
behavioural perceptions on the one hand (e.g. Checkel 2007; March and Olsen 
1989), and actor-level supranationalism caused by behavioural and role 
adaptation through control and discipline on the other (e.g. Trondal et al. 2008). 
Secondly, we also make an analytical distinction between an external dimension – 
actor-level supranationalism originating from outside the organisation (e.g. 
Dehousse and Thompson 2012; Hooghe 2007; 2012) – and an internal dimension 
– actor-level supranationalism emerging from within the organisation (Beyers 
2010; Suvarierol 2011). Before entering an international organisation civil 
servants can be pre-socialised into sharing the goals, ideas and norms of the 
organisation. They can also share these goals, ideas and norms after being re-
socialised within the organisation. Their loyalty to the goals, ideas and norms can 
be affected by internal control and discipline (from within the international 
bureaucracy) as well as by external control and discipline (from member-state 
governments) (Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Trondal 2001) (see Table 1).  
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Table 1 A two-dimensional analytical grid 
 External dimension Internal dimension 
Internalisation  Pre-socialisation nurtured 
outside international 
bureaucracies 
Re-socialisation fostered by 
international bureaucracies 
Adaptation  Pre-adaptation promoted by 
member-states 
Adaptation facilitated by 
international bureaucracies  
 
 
(ii) How, then, do we recognise a civil servant’s enactment of a supranational 
behavioural logic when we come across it? One way of approaching actor-level 
supranationalism is to analyse the ‘international character’ of civil servants’ 
responsibilities. The international character of responsibilities means that the civil 
servants employ the ‘internal logic’ of the international organisation s/he is 
employed in (formal structure, portfolio, rules of procedure etc.). In order to 
follow a supranational logic s/he should be loyal to the mission and vision of the 
international organisation and show this loyalty by guarding against attempts, 
either by member-state governments or other actors, to direct the organisation 
in other directions.  
 
(iii) Actor-level supranationalism entails that civil servants share a set of rules, norms, 
principles and codes of conduct that are relatively inducted, internalised and 
taken for granted (pre-socialisation or socialisation within the international 
organisation) (Checkel 2007). Furthermore, actor-level supranationalism can also 
result from civil servants strategically adapting to a supranational role because of 
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institutional incentives and rewards (cf. internal or external control and 
discipline). The civil servants are expected to become ‘defenders of the system’ 
and to acquire collective behavioural perceptions. Thus, the civil servants may 
acquire a distinct ‘organisational personality’ within international organisations. 
The appearance of actor-level supranationalism denotes actors’ feelings of loyalty 
and allegiance towards the international organisation as a whole (Deutch et al. 
1957: 5-6; Haas 1958: 16; Herrmann et al. 2004: 6). Therefore, when we seek to 
identify actor-level supranationalism we analyse the perceptions, attitudes and 
beliefs of the civil servants in the light of the norms and goals of the international 
organisation. We also analyse what the civil servant would do when confronted 
with issues where different behavioural logics may be in conflict. Do civil servants 
defend the goals of the international organisation in a situation where, for 
example, a member-state advocates preferences that run contrary to the goal 
and/or the rules of the organisation?  
 
One should, however, be careful not to overstate the distinctions between 
different behavioural logics. The occurrence of one behavioural logic (i.e. the 
supranational) does not necessarily exclude the occurrence of another 
behavioural logic (see Trondal et al. 2010). For example, there is often a 
correspondence between the professional expertise of civil servants (an 
epistemic logic) and the ‘international character of responsibilities’ (a 
supranational logic). Of course, professional expertise is often a precondition for 
being able to perform the responsibilities in an international organisation. 
Furthermore, civil servants may be loyal to professional networks (an epistemic 
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logic) and to particular administrative units within the organisation (a 
departmental logic) as well as to the international organisation as a whole (a 
supranational logic) without any conflict between loyalties necessarily arising. 
Concomitantly, possible ‘grey zones’ between behavioural logics are reported in 
the ‘results’ section. 
 
Data and methodology 
The empirical observations benefit from synchronised comparative studies of permanent 
officials in the Commission administration, the WTO Secretariat, and the OECD Secretariat. 
The study is synchronised in the sense that the same interview guide has been applied to all 
three bureaucracies and with respect to the selection of administrative sub-units within each 
bureaucracy. The interviews were semi-directed, using a standardised interview guide that 
was applied flexibly during interviews. The interviews were carried out during 2006 and 2007 
in Brussels, Geneva and Paris. All interviews were taped and fully transcribed. All 
interviewees are treated with full anonymity. Consequently, quotations from interviews are 
referred to as follows (Commission 2, WTO 15, etc.). The questions posed in the interviews 
were directed at measuring the behavioural perceptions among the civil servants. Key 
questions were the following: ‘With whom do you regularly interact at work?’ ‘Does your 
nationality or the nationality of your colleagues “matter” with respect to your daily work?’ 
‘Has an esprit de corps developed within your unit/division?’ “To what extent do you identify 
with or feel a personal attachment towards the following institutions …?’ ‘What kind of roles 
do you regularly emphasise at work?’  
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Interviewees were selected from similar administrative sub-units in all three international 
bureaucracies in order to control for variation in policy sectors. These sub-units were first 
trade units (such as DG Trade in the Commission) and secondly the general secretariats (such 
as the Secretariat-General of the Commission). These bureaucratic sub-units also represent 
vertical specialisation, where the general secretariats represent the bureaucratic centres of 
international bureaucracies and the trade units represent one among several policy 
portfolios of international bureaucracies. Finally, interviewees were selected from different 
levels of rank in these sub-units – from director generals to executive officers. However, by 
concentrating on officials at the ‘A’ level we aim to study officials who are involved in policy-
making activities. Two caveats are warranted: First, the selected cases are merely illustrative 
devices to examine one behavioural logic within international bureaucracies. Secondly, these 
cases also merely illuminate causal mechanisms of actor-level supranationalism.  
 
Results: the supranational actor in international bureaucracies 
Pre-socialisation and re-socialisation  
Civil servants may share the norms of international organisations even before entering. 
These civil servants are predisposed to become loyal to the organisation’s vision and mission 
quite quickly upon arrival. Moreover, if such pre-socialisation is salient, there is a potential 
for a biased (self-)selection among the respondents. In line with the idea of representative 
bureaucracy, the international bureaucracy will in such cases be representative mainly of the 
enthusiasts and true believers in the organisation. Some civil servants indeed start working 
for an international organisation because they truly believe in the organisation. The need to 
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be dedicated to the organisation is also emphasised in the following quotes from two WTO 
officials: 
 
‘We are the guardians of the book. We have to believe in what is in here, because if 
we don’t believe, nobody believes. Then we might as well go home.’ (WTO 9) 
 
‘I think we have to be committed to what the WTO is as an institution, which basically 
is for trade liberalisation, and so clearly you have to believe in that. Otherwise it 
could be very difficult, personally, if you don’t believe in the goal of your 
organisation, that the WTO is an institution which basically is a force for good – you 
know, the goals of the WTO…’ (WTO 3) 
 
One OECD official indicates that s/he was pre-socialised into being enthusiastic, not about 
the OECD in particular but about international organisations in general: 
 
‘I think there was probably something philosophical in the beginning, because when I 
finished university, I was very attracted by the international organisations: the values, 
the mission, things like that.’ (OECD 27) 
 
Another OECD official indicates that his or her enthusiasm for the OECD and what it does 
comes from his or her prior experience in private sector: 
 
‘I am the treasurer of the OECD, and I have a business card. And I am proud of the 
OECD. That is one of the things I like about working at the OECD: I like what the OECD 
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does, it has a positive influence in the world. Coming from the private sector as an 
American, I am very much in favour of a lot of the things the OECD does – like free 
trade; like intelligent government policy over business, over taxation; having 
environment regulations that work, that businesses and people can work with. That 
governments can promote better policies in areas as taxation, thanks to the work 
that the OECD does, is very positive.’ (OECD 23) 
 
One WTO official stated that s/he believed in the GATT/WTO before starting working there, 
but s/he emphasises particular aspects of the organisation’s mission: 
 
‘I believed that market access for products, and how countries become less 
dependent on money by helping them to sell abroad… I believed in that […] but 
across the border, random trade liberalisation… when I came, no I didn’t think…But 
the GATT never stood for that either. The GATT was not about free trade, the GATT 
was about, the WTO is about, breaking down certain barriers and trade-distorted 
measures so that countries at least have more opportunity to sell abroad…’ (WTO 2) 
 
These quotes illustrate that pre-socialisation to the vision and mission of an international 
organisation can enhance the enactment of actor-level supranationalism. At the same time, 
pre-socialisation can take several forms. One important distinction runs between the ‘true 
believers’ – those who believe in the overall mission of the organisation, even as a ‘force for 
good’ – and the ‘sector or portfolio enthusiasts’ – those who believe in particular issues that 
the organisation deals with and in the organisation’s role in solving and handling these 
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issues. In both cases, pre-socialisation seems to be an important factor in explaining the 
behavioural perceptions of these civil servants. 
 
However, civil servants also seem to be affected by internal factors, i.e. they are socialised 
into the norms of the organisation through experience. This complementary form of 
socialisation is linked to the Weberian bureaucracy model, i.e. socialisation within 
organisations. The assumption is that international bureaucracies have a transformative 
capacity in shaping key ideas, norms, beliefs and behaviour among its personnel. In the 
following, we look in particular at how experience from working within an international 
bureaucracy can affect civil servants’ commitment and loyalty to the organisation. We 
should also point out that pre-socialisation does not exclude the effect of re-socialisation: 
someone who shares the norms of the international organisation before working there may 
be further socialised within the organisation. To illustrate this dual mechanism, one civil 
servant responds: 
 
‘Oh yes, I am convinced. I saw… as a junior diplomat I participated in the making of 
this organisation. I saw this organisation being born. I was here in Geneva when the 
organisation was created, and I was here in Geneva when these agreements were 
negotiated. So I truly believe in the ideas.’ (WTO 9) 
 
This official thus relates his or her beliefs in the organisation to the close contact s/he had 
with the WTO in pervious jobs. A Commission official also mentions that his or her 
commitment to the EU began a long time before s/he joined the Commission: 
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‘But I always bore in mind the possibility to work for the institutions, maybe not from 
16 years old but certainly from 22 years old.’ (Commission 20) 
 
Q: ‘So you became rather pre-socialised before you came here? It was actually a wish 
for you to come here?  
I would say not politically, more as a civilian or a citizen of Belgium; I was very much 
conscious of the project of building Europe. From 1973, for instance, I experienced 
the first enlargement. … I was 26 and I thought “Wow, they are enlarging already”. 
(…) And I knew about Jean Monnet […] and I thought “It’s a big project, an important 
project, and it is a project qui vient féderer les états”. It’s politically a very difficult 
project but it is certainly a project I want to work for with my very small means, my 
very small competencies and capacities.’ (Commission 20) 
 
Q: ‘Is it easy to follow that vision – your European vision – in your day-to-day work? 
Yes, because the vision is very strong. My vision of what I want to do and of what the 
Commission wants to do is very coherent. They match one another. But also that 
vision is stronger than, let’s say, the everyday life and problems I can have. That is my 
view. Some other people are more concerned with their own career.’ (Commission 
20) 
 
These quotes illustrate how pre-commitment to the vision and mission of an international 
organisation can enhance the subsequent enactment of a supranational behavioural logic 
after being hired. The following quote from an OECD official illustrates how long tenure in an 
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international bureaucracy can foster a re-socialisation of staff towards actor-level 
supranationalism:  
 
‘Fundamentally, my impression is that when people have joined the OECD, and they 
have worked here for a while, they no longer behave as nationals of any particular 
member country, but they serve the interests of the organisation. And it doesn’t 
really matter whether they are Canadian, Australian or Belgian – they work towards 
the common aim of the organisation.’ (OECD 11) 
 
When asked about his or her commitment to the goals of their organisation, two officials 
respond as follows: 
 
‘Yes, I think so. I mean I’ve spent 30+ years of my life here, so it would be bizarre if I 
did not. I do feel commitment to the organisation. [….] Yes, I feel a commitment. I 
think it would be difficult if you didn’t believe in an open-rules-based trading system, 
that it was in the basic interest of humanity.’ (WTO 1) 
 
‘(…) But, as I said, I think that being an international civil servant and the more years 
you do that type of job, the more you tend to represent the organisation rather than 
individuals or divisions or whatever.’ (OECD 16) 
 
Socialisation into the norms of the organisation can also be illustrated by the following 
response from a WTO official when asked what kind of advice s/he could offer the members: 
‘Of course it has to be WTO-friendly, and then after a while you get… you cannot go against 
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the philosophy of what this institution stands for.’ (WTO 2) In response to the question of 
whether the WTO Secretariat should be the ‘guardians of the treaties’, one WTO official 
clearly confirmed that s/he had taken on the role of a ‘guardian’. However, s/he also 
includes a more proactive role, i.e. as an agent for improving the system:  
 
‘I think this is what has been agreed, but I have my views, and I think there are things 
that should be changed in this agreement to make it fairer, to make it more effective, 
and I will be happy to defend my views. But I think it has to be changed by 
negotiation in this organisation. You are not going to change it by destroying the 
WTO. That is the message. I am the guardian of the book. The book is not perfect. So 
my task is to convince people that this book should be improved, here. That is the 
mission. The mission is to make a multilateral trading system which is fair, which is 
fair to the developing countries, and which is better than what it is now.’ (WTO 9) 
 
This quote illustrates both a sense of commitment to the organisation while at the same 
time seeing the Secretariat’s role as being more than a neutral facilitator. This WTO official 
emphasises the role as a defender of the system, but s/he even includes in his or her role the 
task of suggesting needs for change. Re-Socialisation within international bureacuracies can 
also strengthen civil servants’ feeling of being part of a collective, being part of something 
important: 
 
‘I’m clearly an official of the Commission and I have loyalty to the institutions, to 
defend the position it takes, but at the same time I feel I am part of the bigger 
project. I am not just serving this President, who will leave at a certain point in time, 
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but we are also constructing Europe. And all the time this has taken different 
strength and intensity.’ (Commission 6) 
 
Two other Commission officials emphasise that their feeling of belonging is aimed towards 
European integration generally and not towards particular EU institutions or member-states: 
 
‘Definition-wise, I am working for the European Commission and, in a broader sense, 
for the Union. So I wouldn’t have any ideological problems working for the Council 
Secretariat, for example.’ (Commission 11) 
 
‘Well, it is the Community interest in the matter which is prime, and this interest of 
the Community is not necessarily identical with the interests of any single member 
state – even if you take them all together.’ (Commission 14) 
 
This last quote indicates that the civil servant sees the Community interest as something 
more than the aggregate of member-state collective interests. It alludes to a belief in a 
separate supranational interest – a collective EU interest relatively independent of member-
states. Similarly, Ellinas and Sulleiman’s (2012: 165) recent study demonstrates that a 
majority of top Commission officials share a general culture and attitude towards ‘favouring 
integrative solutions to European problems’. 
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Another Commission official illustrates beliefs shaped by the organisation, however, in this 
case re-socialisation within the Commission seems to have made him or her less dedicated 
to the ‘EU project’: 
 
‘I am more focused on what I do. I am very happy with the job I have, with the 
colleagues I have, I couldn’t be happier. I have to struggle to remain faithful to 
Europe. I am still, but when I joined the Commission, I was for a very long time 
enthusiastic. I mean I was very proud working in the Commission. Not only proud, I 
thought we were going to take us very far. But today I am much more sceptical.’ 
(Commission 24) 
 
This quote illustrates that socialisation within organisations may sometimes result in less 
enthusiastic attitudes towards the organisation. Socialisation should thus not be conflated 
with the emergence of ‘pro-norm behaviour’ (Zurn and Checkel 2007) or ‘pro-social’ 
behaviour (Lewis 2007). Lack of organisational enthusiasm may more easily emerge when 
organisations faces periods of organisational enlargement or internal reforms, potentially 
challenging pre-existing norms and beliefs among the personnel (see Bauer 2012: 469; 
Dehousse and Thompson 2012: 126). ‘Socialization processes do not necessarily entail 
harmony and the absence of conflicts’ (Beyers 2010: 912). 
 
Pre-adaptation and adaptation 
Socialisation sometimes cannot occur fully if the mechanisms of internal and external control 
and discipline operate alone (Checkel 2007; Gheciu 2007). This section shows that control 
and discipline, through incentives and rewards, can contribute to shaping the roles of civil 
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servants and to enhancing the enactment of a supranational role. One aspect of actor-level 
supranationalism among international civil servants is their external representation of the 
international organisation. The enactment of a supranational role – as a representative of 
the international organisation as a whole – is evident in the following quote: 
 
‘It is obvious that when we are operating outside the WTO, in other 
intergovernmental organisations, then we are representing the WTO as an 
institution, and we have to be aware of that.’ (WTO 1) 
 
The WTO official indicates in this quote that s/he has to be aware of the supranational role; 
it is considered mandatory to represent the WTO as a whole. In their external 
representation, civil servants report that if they act in conflict with core rules of the 
organisation they may be subject to internal or external sanctions. When asked about how 
to behave when representing the WTO externally, one WTO official responds: 
 
‘Yes, of course you have to be careful not to say weird things and things that are 
totally just not acceptable, or contentious. To say things about the negotiations sort 
of… on some contentious issues… or to express a strong opinion that you support one 
view or another – that is dangerous and it is not to be tolerated. But it’s not a 
question of asking permission. Now of course, to speak at conferences you have to 
get permission, for obvious reasons. But it’s not so much that you send your 
statement to your boss to check.’ (WTO 13) 
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When asked about the possible sanctions for going against these norms, the same official 
says: ‘You are fired… or you are called in.’ (WTO 13) 
 
Q: ‘Even though the assessments are made according to the WTO rules, do you, as a 
Secretariat official, have to be careful about making formulations such as “This is the 
best solution according to what I believe”? Because if that sentence is there, is there a 
risk that the paper will just be ‘shot down’ by the member states?  
Oh yes, oh yes, there are things you have to be aware of and, you know, sometimes 
you get caught by surprise. There’s a sensitivity that you weren’t aware of and 
somebody reacts very strongly to something and you… “Oh, where did that come 
from?”.’ (WTO 15) 
 
This quote shows that civil servants have to ‘tread a careful path’ because of the awareness 
and control of member-states. The following quotes from OECD officials are also illustrative: 
 
‘As an OECD person, you should be kind of neutral. I’m not working for the French or 
US government, I am working for the OECD. Period.’ (OECD 26) 
 
‘It is quite imperative not to be biased by your nationality.’ (OECD 15) 
 
‘So I am aware of the OECD line and agreed position, and I know it is incumbent upon 
me to reflect that agreed line and the conclusions of the work that we have done. It’s 
not my position to bolster independent opinions on some policy issues that we have 
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not done any research on or where my research hasn’t been done as part of an 
agreed OECD process.’ (OECD 17) 
 
When asked if they all consider themselves international civil servants, one OECD official 
responds: ‘Yes. You have to, in that job; you wouldn’t last long otherwise. We are not here to 
represent our own countries in any way.’ (OECD 2) In sum, external and internal control and 
discipline seem to enhance the adoption of the organisation’s norms among international 
civil servants. Some officials seem to enact a supranational role in the form of ‘guardians of 
the system’. A quote from one WTO official illustrates this. S/he was asked whether the WTO 
agreements amount to a kind of constitution that the civil servants have to relate to at all 
times: 
 
‘Exactly! But I don’t really think… I don’t think I will ever come across someone who 
doesn’t really believe in that. But some people have different views about… you 
know, some people look at it more from a developing-country perspective and other 
people from other perspectives. Some of the people might think that some of the 
rules are more or less equitable.’ (WTO 1) 
 
This quote illustrates that even though civil servants may become ‘guardians of the system’ 
and have to constantly relate to the organisation’s rules, they do not necessarily believe in or 
agree with all rules. Internal and external control and discipline may foster a supranational 
role among civil servants in the sense of ‘guardians of the system’, but the degree to which 
the norms of the organisation have been internalised may still vary. Some are true believers. 
For others the defence of the system is conditional.  
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Concluding discussion 
This paper shows that ’supranational actors’ are present among civil servants both in the 
WTO Secretariat, the OECD Secretariat and the Commission administration. International 
bureaucracies are thus important vehicles of the ‘common good’. Moreover, the 
Commission is not any different in this regard when viewed from the perspective of civil 
servants’ behavioural perceptions. Essentially, this paper challenges the claim that 
international bureaucracies lack the potential to shape some core behavioural perceptions 
among its personnel, and that the roles and behavioural perceptions of international civil 
servants are primarily shaped by domestic government institutions (see also Ellinas and 
Suleiman 2012: 172). The study suggests that international bureaucracies may possess 
considerable capacity to shape their employees – both through behavioural and role 
internalisation and adaptation. Actor-level supranationalism is also shown to rise through 
internal and external processes to international bureaucracies.  Some officials arrive ‘pre-
packed’ to international bureaucracies. However, we also find cases where socialisation 
seems to have taken place within the organisation and thus enhanced the civil servants’ 
adoption of the organisation’s norms, ideas and beliefs. Moreover, internal and external 
control and discipline make it imperative for the civil servants to ‘stick’ to the goals and rules 
of the organisation. The trust of international civil servants seems partly contingent on them 
being perceived as neutral by member-state governments. Actor-level supranationsalism 
may thus also reflect strategic adoption; it pays to be considered as ‘neutral defenders of the 
system’, as defenders of the ‘common good’ (see Ellinas and Suleiman 2012). 
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Actor-level supranationalism seems to be associated with four factors. First, long tenure (i) 
tends to facilitate socialisation and discipline civil servants towards serving the organisation’s 
interests, for example due to career opportunities (Trondal et al. 2008). We see that many 
civil servants in the WTO have had long careers within the bureaucracy, accompanying actor-
level supranationalism among these. Secondly, prior institutional affiliations (ii) seem to 
affect the enactment of actor-level supranationalism. Generally, prior interaction with 
international bureaucracies may foster pre-socialisation into international norms. These 
findings coincide with the conclusion that pre-socialisation can make international civil 
servants favourably disposed to the international organisation’s norms (Hooghe 2007). One 
possible consequence of this is that there may be a bias towards dedicated civil servants in 
the recruitment to international bureaucracies. Third, the size and scope of administrative 
capacity (iii) and the portfolio of international bureaucracies seem to matter. Comparatively, 
the Commission administration stands out compared to the two other international 
bureaucracies, both by having a political leadership (College of Commissioners) and by 
having a sizable administration with a strengthened Secretariat-General (Kassim 2009). The 
WTO Secretariat is clearly the smallest bureaucracy of the three. Moreover, it is closely 
watched by member-state governments and operates within a narrower mandate than the 
Commission administration and the OECD Secretariat. Finally, the power and autonomy (iv) 
of international bureaucracies seems to matter. The three international bureaucracies 
studied here differ considerably in this regard. Both the Commission and the WTO produce 
hard law, i.e. binding rules, whereas the OECD is a soft-law producer, i.e. it makes 
recommendations, benchmarks, standards, guidelines etc. which are voluntary for member-
states to follow. We may assume that this makes it more likely that the control of member-
state governments is stronger on the WTO and the Commission than on the OECD. This may 
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again favour actor-level supranationalism in the WTO Secretariat and the Commission 
administration because civil servants are encouraged to appear as neutral defenders of the 
system. Furthermore, the Commission has exclusive legal competences and thus clearly has 
the most de jure competences of the three bureaucracies. Arguably, this increases the 
probability that the Commission is more closely associated to a supranational interest than 
the two other bureaucracies. 
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